Module Details

Managerial incentives

GS1120

Course
Managerial incentives
Code
GS1120
Academic Year
2024/2025
Curriculum Year
2023/2024
Degree Programme
ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
Curriculum
A28 - ECONOMIA
Course coordinator
-
Lecturers
Credits
5
Lecture Hours
30
Scientific Disciplinary Sector (SSD)
SECS-P/06 - Applied Economics
Course Type
Single-subject learning activity
Course Delivery
OPZ - Opzionale
Year
2
Teaching period
Primo Semestre
Campus
ALESSANDRIA
Teaching language
English
Course Contents
Corporate scandals (Enron, Parmalat, Lehman Brothers) around the world have reinforced the perception that managers are unwatched. The course starts by emphasizing the importance of managerial accountability. Then, the course offers a review of the various instruments and factors that help align managerial incentives with those of firm. A special attention is devoted to the objective of the firm, namely, whom managers should be accountable to.

The course contents might be modified to include seminars or lectures by Visiting Professors.
Reference Texts
Brickely, Smith, Zimmerman - Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture. Irvin McGraw Hill, sixth edition.
Tirole. The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press (chapter I).
Learning Outcomes
1) Knowledge and understanding skills.
Knowledge of governance systems and manager incentive issues in light of corporate goals and performance.

2) Ability to apply knowledge and understanding.
To be able to identify governance systems and manager incentive problems and envisage solutions for the firm.

3) Autonomy of judgment.
To use economic analysis to discriminate among alternative governance models useful in interpreting empirical evidence on incentive conflict issues.

4) Communication skills.
To be able to understand the impact in terms of value to the firm and stakeholders of different corporate governance structures and managerial incentives.

5) Learning skills.
To be familiar with the relevant literature on the topic of managerial incentives and corporate governance, and the main evidence on the consequences of incentive conflict and governance structures, particularly in Italy and Europe.
Prerequisites
The course does not require any particular prerequisite.
Teaching Methods
Teacher-led lessons (theory and exercises).
Additional Information
Attendance is not mandatory but highly recommended.

Other useful resources:
https://ideas.repec.org/
http://www.ssrn.com/en/
www.scholar.google.com

Department's electronic resources:
www.scopus.com
http://apps.webofknowledge.com/UA_GeneralSearch_input.do?product=UA&search_mode=GeneralSearch&SID=Z1PHRcE6xJX5IyMyunz&preferencesSaved=

Students with physical disabilities, Learning Disabilities or Special Education Needs can request specific services and tools via the Staff Sviluppo e Coordinamento Carriere e Servizi alle Studentesse e agli Studenti, consulting the University webpage: https://www.uniupo.it/en/services/servicesstudents-physical-or-learning-disabilities Students with disabilities, learning disabilities or special education needs, once they have contacted the University Staff, can refer to the tutor in charge of the course to define the examination modalities, concerning academic aspects.
Assessment Methods
The exam is written (in English) and consists of three parts: 1) an open question on fundamental aspects of the course, 2) an exercise divided into several sub-points, 3) a series of specific questions. The duration of the test is 1 hour and 30 minutes.
The exam will focus on all the material mentioned in the "Course texts" session, including the slides in Moodle. Examples of questions and exercises included in the written exam can be found in the "Self-evaluation problems" and "Review questions" sections at the end of each chapter of Brikley, Smith, Zimmerman (sixth edition). The maximum grade attainable in the written exam is 32/30 (“trenta e lode”). Students can take up to 3 possibly consecutive written tests during the exams sessions of the year.
Detailed Syllabus
1) Incentive conflicts and contracts
2) Controlling incentive problems in firms through contracts
3) Implicit contracts and reputational concerns
4) Incentives compensation
5) Corporate governance
The course programme might be modified to include seminars or lectures by Visiting Professors.
Expected Learning Outcomes
At the end of the course, the student will be able to:
1.Define the firm as a focal point for a set of contracts.
2.Identify important owner-manager conflicts, as well as other potential stakeholder conflicts.
3.Explain how contracts can be used to help control incentive problems.
4.List the important trade-offs in effective compensation plans.
5.Identify the various forms of incentive pay and discuss the controversy surrounding incentive pay.
6.Describe the decision authority and incentives of shareholders, boards of directors, and top management of large corporations.
7.Explain how market forces contribute to corporate governance.
Last update:09-09-2026 00:14:31