Ateneo - UPO

The course will introduce the basic topics and tools of strategic reasoning and noncooperative Game Theory, aimed to understand some fundamental applications to the theory of the firm.

1) Robert Gibbons, Teoria dei Giochi, Il Mulino 2) C. D. Aliprantis e S. K. Chakrabarti, Games and Decision Making, Oxford university press, 2010. 3) A. Mas- Colell, M.D. Whinston, J. Green, Microeconomic Theory (For a deeper learning of the topic)

The aim of the course is to provide students with the basic elements of non-cooperative game theory useful to deal with models of interaction among consumers and among firms. At the end of the course students will master the analytical tools for understanding, modeling and forecasting the strategic behaviours of economic agents and will be able to appropriately solve problems in an economic and financial contexts of strategic interaction, by using suitable game theoretic concepts.

Real functions of one and more real variables, optimization, basic notions of Probability Theory

Lectures and exercises during classes Some classes wlll be held in flipped format.

Students with physical disabilities, Learning Disabilities or Special Education Needs can request specific services and tools via the Staff Sviluppo e Coordinamento Carriere e Servizi alle Studentesse e agli Studenti, consulting the University webpage: https://www.uniupo.it/en/services/servicesstudents-physical-or-learning-disabilities Students with disabilities, learning disabilities or special education needs, once they have contacted the University Staff, can refer to the tutor in charge of the course to define the examination modalities, concerning academic aspects.

Grades up to 26/30 will be awarded through a final written exam consisting of two structured exercises and a theoretical question, for both attending and non-attending students. Grades above 22/30 will be assessed based on the ability to present the content of simple scientific papers or a new topic assigned by the instructor, as well as the in-class interaction of those who attended. Alternatively, non-attending students may take a supplementary oral exam consisting of theoretical questions and critical analysis of the program.

Introduction to Game Theory, elements and representations of a game, games and information (complete, incomplete, perfect, imperfect). Games in normal form, pure strategies, concepts of solution, dominant and dominated strategies, solution by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, best reply, Nash equilibrium. Examples: Prisoner's Dilemma, Matching Pennies, Coordination Games. Existence and multiplicity of Nash equilibria, mixed strategies, Nash's Theorem. Extensive form games, strategies in an extensive form game, solutions: backward induction and refinements, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Repeated finite and infinite games, trigger strategies, Folk Theorem. Collusion. Bayesian Games.

The expected learning outcomes for a minimum passing level are: - Ability to recognize a situation of strategic interaction between decision makers. - Ability to identify the constituent elements of a game in normal or extended form. - Ability to find solutions to a game already represented in strategic or extended form. The expected outcomes for an intermediate/advanced level are: - Ability to translate and represent any real-world situation of strategic interaction into an appropriate game form. - Ability to switch from normal to extended form and vice versa. - Ability to find the equilibrium of a game, including by identifying best-reply functions and using mixed strategies. - Fair ability to adapt the choice of tools to the necessary variants. - Fair ability to clearly and rigorously communicate the logical-deductive paths followed in tackling problems. Ability to understand and present the content of short scientific articles on the topics covered in the course.